2009

Revisiting Ann Tickner

Noemi Gal-Or

Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Follow this and additional works at: http://kora.kpu.ca/facultypub

Part of the Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons

Original Publication Citation


This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at KORA: Kwantlen Open Resource Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of KORA: Kwantlen Open Resource Access. For more information, please contact kora@kpu.ca.
Revisiting Ann Tickner

Noemi Gal-Or
KWANTLEN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

This paper refutes Ann Tickner’s (1992) statement that ‘[w]omen have defined security as the absence of violence whether it be military, economic or sexual’. First, the paper maintains that in the absence of a category representative of the ‘general woman’, and because there are categories aggregating ‘particular women’ who hold their unique understandings of security, this part of Tickner’s (2001) statement, which is based on the actor’s identity, must fail. Second, having examined whether the definition of security as the absence of violence—military, economic, or sexual—represents an exclusive female approach, the paper concludes that the meaning of security depends on considerations specific to particular individual persons, hence may or may not be gender specific. Third, the paper questions the existence of two types of security— a ‘security redux’ less a ‘human’ attribute versus human security. It finds that although the inception of the concept of human security may be indebted to feminist thought, its grounding in the human rights discourse has so far not led to a corresponding transformation of the security discourse. This applies equally to the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect—a direct ‘sequel’ to the conceptualisation of human security.

Keywords: Human security, gender, feminism, Ann Tickner.

This paper was written as a contribution to Feminist Security Studies Group of the International Studies Association. Specifically, it was designed to contemplate revisiting peace and security by reference to Ann Tickner’s (1992) assertion that ‘[w]omen have defined security as the absence of violence whether it be military, economic or sexual’. Seven years later, this broad statement required clarification, and elicited questions. As current women-driven security related initiatives at the international level show, Tickner’s view is not yet commonplace. For instance, the latest international account on the role and condition of women in matters of security focuses specifically on the effects of military hostilities (‘impact of armed conflict’): ‘[d]espite the Security Council’s repeated appeals to respect the equal rights of women and their role in peace processes and in peacebuilding, millions of women and children continue to account for the majority of casualties in hostilities, often in flagrant violation of human rights and humanitarian law’ (United Nations Security Council, 2008a, 2008b). Politically and institutionally, the agenda of conceptual transformation that feminists have been pursuing for so long remains outstanding. But, did the vast feminist academic work succeed in elucidating the term ‘security’—not safety—specifically as it relates to women’s life experiences and interpretations?

This paper uses feminist scholarship to analyse the above question. Mindful of the voluminous expanse of feminist literature, which provides for—and is divided by—a wide spectrum of methodological approaches, this paper attempts to gloss over this fact. It proceeds from the assumption that women’s experiences and their interpretation necessarily arise from the multitude of intersectional manifestations of women’s experiences and therefore is seeking to distil some of the recently developed but very disparate feminist knowledge in an attempt to elucidate the common essence of this feminist study. At the same time, the paper is not set out to apply feminist analysis exclusively. To the contrary, the following analysis employs ‘traditional’ international relations (IR) methodology,’ while being attentive to the rift separating IR studies writ large and feminist international studies. And precisely because women do figure as an important and central actor in world politics (although more
often than not in the status of the underdog), this paper should be understood as representing a trans-disciplinary effort to bridge the gap separating the two approaches.

It is from this point of departure that the paper seeks to arrive at some generalisations about women and security. Opening with an examination as to whether there exists a prototype ‘general woman’ to which a position regarding security can be attributed, it continues by contemplating whether there is a ‘particular woman’ type to which a position regarding security can be attributed. The paper then asks whether defining security as the absence of violence—either military, economic, or sexual—represents an exclusive female position (whether the ‘general’ or ‘particular’ woman). A section analysing security as juxtaposed with human security and relating to the responsibility to protect follows. A conclusion wraps up the paper.

IS THERE A PROTOTYPE ‘GENERAL WOMAN’ TO WHOM A SPECIAL NOTION OF SECURITY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED?

In order to define, or at least describe, the ‘general woman’, two challenges must be accounted for. First, feminist enquiry tends to address the woman in comparison to the man rather than independently from man, standing for herself. Second, perhaps as a consequence of this comparative focus, feminist literature has yet to come up with a characterisation of what—from a feminist perspective—constitutes a woman. As a self-depicting liberating discipline, the feminist emphasis on what a woman is not, or how the perception or image of the woman has been constructed and construed by man, distracts from the bare question of ‘what’ a woman is. Indeed, postmodernist feminism maintains such ‘essentialist’ preoccupation to be unwarranted and therefore ‘aims at deconstructing the fiction of the category of woman’ altogether (Withworth, 1994, p. ix). Critical feminism prefers to circumvent the definition of woman and rather focus on the relationships between the actors of the different sexes (given particular circumstances) (Withworth, 1994). Consequently, it is safe to conclude that feminist theories have not defined the ‘general woman’. In fact, the feminist inquiry has been increasingly moving away from generalisations, including those regarding the identity of the actors (agents) involved in the gendered relationship. Therefore, the generalising part of Ann Tickner’s statement that ‘[w]omen have defined security as the absence of violence whether it be military, economic or sexual’ (1992, emphasis added) stands on shaky grounds.

IS THERE A ‘PARTICULAR WOMAN’ TO WHOM A SPECIAL NOTION OF SECURITY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED?

If there is no ‘general woman’ prototype, it is safe to conclude that the woman is a human being, as much as any other, namely man, but that the woman may be categorised as being typical of a specific category of human being. Some categories may have a higher concentration of women than men, and vice versa. Those categories are biologically determined—first, since women and men are biologically different, and second, because in addition to this basic distinction there are other sub-categories, e.g. lesbians who consist exclusively of women (and which form part of the larger taxonomy of people with same sex orientation). Human beings are also socially ‘constructed’—as feminist literature has amply shown. Consequently, the ‘particular woman’ would represent an inter-sectorial combination of biological and social traits, based on distinct culture (religion, ideology, and so forth), politics, economics, social
environment, and along varying lifecycle spans. Again, this is not unlike the ‘particular’ man. Among these different groupings, it is reasonable to expect to find women who represent very unique attitudes towards war and peace, but also others, who share with men the same specific attitude to war and peace. An example of such a particular group is those women pressing for increased presence, visibility, participation, and authority and power in matters of peace and humanitarian operations. In working together to advance this goal, some women have carved out a niche for themselves within the overall context of security. Congregating around a common cause, this special group is attracting that certain type of ‘particular woman’ characterised by a distinct attitude towards war and peace. For instance, the members of Women in International Security (WIIS) (mostly American) and more specifically, those participating in its Special Initiative: Women in Peace Operation Project are a case in point. The objective of this initiative is to ‘improve the capacity of international and regional organizations to engage in peace operations by expanding the opportunities available to women with relevant expertise’ (Peace Operation Project, 2006). WIIS however maintains an indeterminative view of security. Its mission statement reads: ‘1. WIIS defines international security broadly, [sic] inclusive of a range of disciplines such as conflict resolution and human rights, but focuses on the intersection or nexus of these issues with security’ (Peace Operation Project, 2006). To be sure, rather than defining security, the quotation shuns definition. Moreover, the WIIS newsletter reflects this indecisiveness, recognising that:

In the feminist community, a certain kind of reverse typecasting also showed itself, by which some feminists simply opposed all military service, female or male, arguing that increased female participation in politics would now produce a peaceful world. WIIS from its outset was not premised on any such particular assumptions about what produces war or peace. […] What was envisaged for WIIS at the outset was thus to have a forum in which females interested in military questions would get to know each other, including of course females already rising to higher ranks and command positions within the military and the Department of Defense. (Quester, 2008, p. 3)

In other words, different women will maintain different approaches to, and interpretations of, security. Ann Tickner herself refers to the diversity in women’s approaches to security, observing that ‘[t]he image of female soldiers fighting and dying in wars, as was evidenced in the Gulf War of 1991, is deeply disturbing to public opinion. While placing women in combat is motivated by the liberal principle of equality, it is in strong tension with the culturally embedded view of what it means to be a warrior’ (Tickner, 2001, p. 58). However, her focus is pointed at the judgment by other women and men of this particular group, and the problematique caused by the observers. Tickner (2001) is not interested in the women observed. In conclusion, the WIIS example shows that there exists at least one type of ‘particular woman’, namely the woman who participates in the establishment institutions of security and who holds a distinct view of security.

Having disposed with one aspect of the generalising part of Tickner’s (1992) statement—the definition of ‘woman’, I now turn to address this generalisation in relation to the remainder of the statement—‘security as the absence of violence whether it be military, economic or sexual’.
DOES DEFINING SECURITY AS THE ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE—MILITARY, ECONOMIC, OR SEXUAL—REPRESENT AN EXCLUSIVE FEMALE POSITION (WHETHER THE ‘GENERAL’ OR ‘PARTICULAR’ WOMAN’S)?

That the term ‘security’ has in the past two decades expanded to include more than military security is evidenced in the reception of the term ‘human security’, which expanded the spectrum of the security envelope. The difference between the ‘old’ security and the new human security concepts is mainly in the subject to be secured. While the former concentrates on the protection and defence of the State and the nation against foreign threats and dangers, the latter focuses on the protection of individuals and communities against any form of political violence (Human Security Centre, 2005). What political violence is, is subject to divergent opinions, but as a general concept, human security is a term agreeable to both men and women, with which either are now versant, and to which the commitment has therefore become gender neutral.

Certainly, Tickner’s (1992) reference represents the broader approach to human security also endorsed by the UN and articulated in the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994, Human Development Report (United Nations Development Program, 1994) and the Commission on Human Security’s (CHS) 2003 report, Human Security Now (United Nations Commission on Human Security, 2003). The former reads: ‘In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity’ (United Nations Development Program, 1994). The Human Development Report identifies four essential characteristics of human security—that it is universal, interdependent, easier to ensure through early prevention, and people-centred. Indeed, this approach attests to the incorporation of feminist insights within mainstream thought, especially ones developed within critical feminist theory.

The CHS report, which picked up on UNDP’s conceptualisation of human security, further elaborated on it by defining human security as follows:

To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. (United Nations Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4, emphasis added)

In addition to the essential characteristics of human security mentioned above, the CHS listed ‘freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment’ (ibid) as forming the platform for both human and national security. Importantly, the CHS also recognised the multicultural reality of the human community and condition, consequently nuancing the concept’s application; it adds—and limits the specificity of its definition of human security—the following:

The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be ‘vital’—what they consider to be ‘of the essence of life’ and ‘crucially important’—varies across individuals and societies. That is why any concept of human security must
be dynamic. And that is why we refrain from proposing an itemized list of what makes up human security. (United Nations Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4, emphasis added)

As observed above, in this formulation too, traces of feminist theoretical influences are noticeable since the feminist notion of the inter-sectionality of the individual person can be clearly read into it. At the same time however, the statement dilutes the bedrock of human security—by relativising it and consequently making it dependent on a multitude of interpretations, some of which might even be contradictory.

Again, as noted in the earlier sections of this paper, and following the human security discourse, the conclusion must be that there is no ‘general individual person’, and that therefore, the meaning of security depends on specific considerations, in other words, of ‘particular individual persons’. This moves the discussion over to the final stage: Are there two types of security—a ‘security redux’ less a ‘human’ attribute, and human security?

**WHAT IS SECURITY?**

**Human Security**

Having established that at the current historical juncture, to understand security as a general concept dependent on the particular actor’s gender (or sex) is no longer compelling, the following section will explore whether there are different types of security which apply to particular types of actors.

Pauline Ewan’s (2007) analysis comes in handy here. It highlights the two crucial points of distinction between security and human security. First, human security is ‘associated with a potentially transformative project that deconstructs traditional national security discourse and practices and seeks to reinvent the theory and practice of security’ (Ewan, 2007, p. 182, emphasis added). Unlike security, human security has a (counter-hegemonic) socio-political goal. Second, the difference between the two concepts lies in the source of the threat: Security is concerned with threat against the State (and nation), whereas human security focuses on (direct and indirect, by commission or omission) threat by the State. Consequently, this deconstruction shifts the focus of attention from ‘freedom from fear’ to ‘freedom from want’.

Regarding human security as a transformative project: The rationale for a gendered interpretation of human security—that it fosters a ‘solidarist concern’—rests on shaky grounds. First, a concern does little by way of altering real facts, namely, that violence is antagonistic by definition. Solidarity is anathema to antagonism. A solidarist concern may suggest an approach to resolve—even prevent the threat of—violence which underlies security, and without which there would be no insecurity. It cannot define either violence or security. Second, to link the solidarist concern with attention to the disenfranchised (specifically in the North-South context and within it, to women), and highlight its ethnographic or ethno-political focus, only adds confusion since the latter are often at the origin of insecurity and antagonism.

Regarding the source of the threat: As Ewan (2007) explains, the shift is associated with early post-Cold War expectations for a period of peace and investment in peace. Because this historical context was relatively short-lived (less than a decade), to argue that human security today still represents a holistic approach is to overlook its historical obsolescence, and may be misleading. Indeed, human security today reflects an evolution not so much in the conceptualisation of security, but rather in the conceptualisation of human rights. More
than a shift, there has been a growing and additional recognition of sorts of threats to so-
called second- and third-generation human rights. Human security ‘de-politicises’ violence
by identifying violence as ‘economic’ and ‘structural’ and juxtaposing it against a ‘delimited’
and ‘securitised’ (‘old’) understanding of violence, with the key attributes of ‘organised’ and
‘institutionalised’ (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2008).

Two different empirical studies assist in dissipating the feminist human security discourse.
Erik Melander’s (2005) analysis is especially helpful for it focuses on the hypotheses under-
lying the nexus between gender equality and ‘violence’ by the State (identified above as the
focus of the human security concept). The contribution by Beate Rudolf and Andrea
Eriksson (2007) is in elucidating the legal interpretations of specific human security foci.

Melander’s (2005) analysis spans the period of 1977–1996 and is the first study to subject
the feminist security approach to empirical testing. The research focuses on the proposition
that absent social hierarchy, less intra- and inter-societal collective violence (by state agents
against the personal integrity) is to be expected. Melander distinguishes three arguments
concerning the role of ‘political gender equality’ (i.e. by representation in political institu-
tions): the essentialist argument based on the biological assumption attributing to the female
a natural biological aversion to violence; the constructivist argument concerning gender role
perceptions; and the spurious correlation argument that ‘the same factors and processes that
make political systems grant political rights to women may also make them grant other in-
dividual and human rights’ (Melander, 2005, p. 152). The findings are mixed. Generally,
political gender equality in parliament may reinforce the benign effect of democracy—or,
democracy may reinforce the benign effect of political gender equality—by association with
lower levels of abuse of personal integrity rights by state agents (Melander, 2005). Whatever
the nuances, several finding are of particular interest in the context of this paper, and con-
cerning Tickner’s (1992) statement.

First, Melander’s (2005) research found the essentialist (biological) argument more diffi-
cult to reconcile with his findings when compared with the constructivist approach. Second,
the constructivist ‘selection argument’ according to which women in executive positions
owe their status to their tendency to hold a masculine value bias, also failed to find any
support. Had it been validated, such argument would have supported Tickner’s (1992)
statement by way of contradistinction between the exception of a few political women, on
the one hand, and the rest of women, on the other hand. Both these findings by Melander
tend to support this paper’s argument.

The third finding that ‘uncertainty remains about the causal mechanism through which
political gender equality reduces personal integrity rights abuse’ (Melander, 2005, p. 152),
the fourth finding, i.e. Melander’s final but indeterminant conclusion ‘that a gender perspec-
tive can be relevant for our understanding of many different aspects of collective violence’
(p. 164), and the proposition (which Melander accepts as an assumption) that ‘ethnic conflict
is less amenable to social compromises than other conflicts’ (p. 159), all support the arguments
made here regarding the gender ‘neutrality’ of human security and the fallacy of the ethno-
graphic contribution to a supposed gendered explanation.

The work by Rudolf and Eriksson (2007) complements Melander’s (2005) research be-
cause the authors offer a different type of empirical research. In their application of a gendered
perspective to constitutional law and legal awards by international tribunals and universal
and human rights bodies, the authors highlight the distinction separating security from human
security; they put the holistic quality of human security (as a substitute for security) in
question. Rudolf and Eriksson (2007) focus on various courts’ interpretations of human
rights abuses which specifically target women, and which form part of the spectrum of human security. These include the general notion of the ‘vulnerable person’ who is dependent on protection by the State and whose human rights may be considered as being breached due to the State’s omission. The courts’ decisions reviewed\textsuperscript{14} emphasise the positive obligations of the State to protect. In the cases dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), this duty was found to apply to human dignity as a foundational basis and universal standard of the human rights regime. Adding a gendered construction to the general regime, the court found the duties to apply also in the specific instances in point—the ‘de-basing character’ of rape and the duty to respect a person’s autonomy in order to ensure effective equality between the sexes. In the slavery case, the ECtHR preferred to reach a similar finding via an analysis of the State’s obligations under the regime of the law of treaties, focusing on a ‘pre-feminist’ international convention, which nevertheless already incorporated a gendered-like approach.

The UNHRC investigation discussed in Rudolf and Eriksson (2007) deals with an abortion case of a minor who was raped. While not applying a gendered approach \textit{prima facie}, such an approach—which recognises the different needs of men and women—can be read into its interpretation. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) procedure addressed a case of domestic violence. This procedure was \textit{a priori} gendered—both on grounds of being a CEDAW procedure and on the merits of the case.

What do the three cases suggest concerning the human security versus security debate? First, as the authors concluded, regardless of the fact that the only specifically women-oriented forum was CEDAW, all the tribunals’ decisions adjusted the law by construing a duty of the State to effectively protect the \textit{human rights of women}. Second, and in addition, in the ECtHR and CEDAW procedures, a culture-based interpretation played a dominant role. While the ECtHR considered it in the context of the ‘margin of appreciation’ (representing the State’s discretion to choose the means to protect human rights in accordance with its legal system and obligations under public international law),\textsuperscript{15} the CEDAW procedure took into consideration the traditional discriminatory gender attitudes according to which women have been perceived as inferior to men and which traditionally have been justificatory of violence against women. Arguably, the cultural (constructivist), rather than the essentialist (biological), factor trumps in matters human security (and violence). This conclusion supplements Melander’s arguments above.

Third, all the above procedures contextualised the cases—which were brought against the State—within the State’s international \textit{human rights} obligations and the State’s municipal criminal (in contradistinction with civil) laws, wherein the breaches amounted to at least harassment as a ‘specific form of violence’ (Rudolf & Eriksson, 2007, p. 522). None of the awards considered the adjudicated cases as part of a broader holistic legal domain of \textit{human security}. Again, as in Melander (2005), collective security is not necessarily gendered nor is human security necessarily holistic for it is addressed as a matter of rights, not security.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Responsibility to Protect}

The line of thinking illustrated in the UNDP and CHR reports mentioned earlier propelled the next stage of development regarding security, namely a process of normative transformation. It has been articulated as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which imposes a duty on the State to engage actively in protecting human security. This represents a fundamental departure from the international minimalist traditional approach recognising only the essential
right of the State to protect its citizens, but no corresponding duty. It is endorsed—as well as contested—by both women and men, although, as mentioned, its origins may be traced back to feminist studies and feminist approaches to security. It is interesting to note that while individual (and community collective) rights form the centrepiece of the new concept of human security, and feature as the chief concern of R2P, the main focus is on obligations.

Following six months of deliberations preceding the resolution (United Nations General Assembly, 2005) to endorse the UN principle of R2P, the member states concluded the debate by limiting the threshold for a ‘just cause’ of intervention. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome stipulate the conditions permitting the execution of the duty to protect: the crime of genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Faithful to the conceptualisation of human security, these R2P paragraphs were placed under sub-heading IV, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, not III, Peace and Collective Security. Jean-François Thibault (2008) explains this choice as reflecting the confusion concerning R2P (an implicitly, human security). Given that the extant international legal framework to address the most extreme political catastrophes remains wanting, any extensive interpretation of R2P might only further muddle politics, hence add risk rather than protection to the victims of humanitarian catastrophes (Thibault, 2008). To be sure, in his latest annual report to the UN General Assembly, while addressing R2P, the Secretary-General focused on the role reserved for the State in this matter as a correlate of the State’s ‘sustained positive and affirmative vision of sovereignty as responsibility’ (United Nations Secretary General, 2008, emphasis added). Arguably, security and the broader concept of human security, remain legally ‘tangible’ only at the behest of the State. Under the circumstances, developing a ‘solidarist concern’ remains a wish to be fulfilled.

This impression finds resonance also in Ann Tickner’s more recent (2001) statement that ‘[t]he valorization of war through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic’ (p. 49), which lies at the source of the understanding of security. Hence, from a gender neutral angle, or even a women-biased gender perspective, ‘a different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies’ (Tickner, 2001, p. 49) is warranted.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper set out to study the validity of Ann Tickner’s (1992) statement that ‘[w]omen have defined security as the absence of violence whether it be military, economic or sexual’. The analysis first addressed the definition of ‘women’, questioning whether there is a representative ‘general woman’, and in the alternative, a ‘particular women’, to which any notion of security might be attributed. While the answer to the former was found to be negative, it has been established that there are categories aggregating ‘particular women’, and that these hold their unique understandings of security. In this way, the paper disposed with the generalisation in Tickner’s (2001) statement which is based on the actor. The paper then proceeded to probe this generalisation by focusing on the second part of the statement. Here the question was whether defining security as the absence of violence—military, economic, or sexual—represents an exclusive female position (whether of the ‘general’ or ‘particular’ woman). The response to this question was that the meaning of security depended on specific considerations, i.e of particular individual persons, and hence may or may not be gender specific. Finally, given that gender is not a necessary variable in determining the understanding of security, the discussion turned to explore the second part of Tickner’s (2001)
statement regarding the meaning of security. The question here was whether there were two
types of security—a ‘security redux’ less a ‘human’ attribute versus human security. While
the inception of human security appears to have been strongly influenced by feminist thought,
it has so far failed in transforming the security discourse for human security which appears
to be strongly anchored to the human rights discourse which remains separate from the se-
curity domain. This has been found to be reinforced by considerations of the concept (norm)
of R2P as a direct ‘sequel’ to the development of the idea of human security.

NOTES

1 Originally prepared for ‘Inroads: Selected Feminist Security Studies Panels at the ISA’, Annual Interna-
tional Studies Association Conference ISA09, February 15-18, 2009, New York, USA.
2 Exact citation unavailable—was provided in the call for papers feminist security ISA 2009.
3 Which differs from the leading feminist methodology which is designed to: (a) generate knowledge by
emphasising listening, conversation, and reporting grassroots experience; and (b) be activist, embracing
a political emancipatory program (see Tickner (2001) and Kennedy (2001) for a critique of—among
other things—the international human rights movement’s activism, including regarding women’s rights).
Kennedy argues that ‘[i]t is bad if women have been represented in too narrow or stereotypical a fashion,
even if the only consequence is to pry loose some resources for redistribution to women’ (2001, p. 249).
4 Feminists have been alienated by IR’s discounting attitude to both women as a factor in world politics
and their studies researching this fact. ‘IR and feminism were politically at odds with one another: IR
concerned with order and feminism concerned always with disrupting those order(s)’ (Withworth, 1994,
p. 21).
5 Hilary Charlesworth, a noted feminist legal scholar, has recently suggested the need to be ‘more cautious
about invoking the argument that women have a particular “affinity” with peace’ (quoted in Hunter,
6 Mary Burguières, mentioned in Tickner (2001, p. 61), is leading a similar approach.
7 Tickner (2001), in a publication almost ten years after making the statement analysed here.
8 Human security is a ‘child’ of the human rights discourse. It would be interesting to apply Kennedy’s
(2001) observation concerning comparative hegemonic versus alternative vocabularies to assess the viabil-
ity of ‘human security’ as representing humanitarian norms in general, and norms regarding gender
issues in particular. ‘Intensifying stereotypical representations of women might be thought to have an
effect on at least some women (perhaps only plaintiffs and women using the human rights movement
as a vehicle of self-expression and freedom, and others who learn who they are from what the human
rights movement says women are), encouraging them to become narrower and more stereotypical or to
think of themselves more narrowly than they otherwise might. And, of course, such representations
would have an effect if they encouraged people in some positions of authority—judges, men, legislators,
other women—to exclude women not meeting this stereotypical profile from benefits they would otherwise
receive’ (p. 249).
9 This recognition has recently been institutionalised with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Right (United Nations High Commissioner
on Human Rights, 2008).
10 Melander (2005) studies female leaders and parliamentarians in democratic and non-democratic countries
and includes various control variables, such as democracy, civil and international war.
11 The spurious argument was found irrelevant at the outset, when formulating the research hypotheses.
They argue that nondiscriminatory constitutional provisions are in themselves insufficient to secure women-specific human rights.

Although this is not their intention, such conclusions emerge from their work.

In this article, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), and a procedure established under the Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

‘[R]ecognizing the need to accord states the opportunity to take into account the cultural and legal traditions, as well as moral convictions, prevalent in their respective societies and to weigh conflicts of interest therein when making choices’ (Rudolf & Eriksson, 2007, p. 509), and ‘its approach arguably taking into account other relevant factors, such as the special vulnerability of migrant women stemming from internationalized cultural stereotypes and lack of access to education’ (Rudolf & Eriksson, 2007, p. 517).

This understanding may change over time. Tickner’s (1992) statement, which this paper studies, refers to the past and present.

Ignoring, for the sake of argument, the finding that a ‘general woman’ does not exist.

REFERENCES


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Noemi Gal-Or is the Director of the Institute for Transborder Studies, and Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kwantlen Polytechnic University.

Noemi Gal-Or
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
12666-72nd Avenue
Surrey, B.C.
Canada V3W 2M8
Email: noemi.gal-or@kwantlen.ca