We propose that hindsight bias in adults and some limitations in children's 'theory of mind' (ToM), or mental'state reasoning, share a core cognitive constraint: a tendency to be biased by one's current knowledge when attempting to recall, or reason about, a more naive cognitive state'regardless of whether thatmore naive state is one's own earlier naive state or someone else's. That is, hindsight bias is a fundamental problem in cognitive perspective'taking. We review the developmental literature on hindsight bias as well as other limitations that resemble hindsight bias. We believe that some of children's limitations inToMmay stem, from the same core component as hindsight bias, and thus, will shed light on the underlying mechanisms. We discuss several processes thatmay contribute to this biased perspective'taking. We believe a developmental approach is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the nature of hindsight bias in social cognition.
